



Directorate of  
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## Terrorism Review

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20 January 1983

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GI TR 83-002  
20 January 1983

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**Terrorism  
Review**

25X1

20 January 1983

1	Lull in West European Terrorism (OGI)	25X1
3	Arms Seizure Leads to Arrest of Possible Accomplice in Papal Shooting (OGI)	25X1
5	Guatemalan Terrorists Target Presidential Families (OGI)	25X1
7	Yasir Arafat—The PLO's Consensus Leader (OGI)	25X1
		25X6
13	Special Analysis: French Counterterrorist Attitudes—How Equal? How Fraternal? (OGI)	25X1
15	Statistical Overview	
17	Chronology	

*Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone*

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
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**Lull in West European  
Terrorism**

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Prominent international terrorist groups remain relatively inactive in Western Europe with the exception of the Iberian peninsula and United Kingdom. [ ]

In Spain, probes by the two major Basque terrorist groups ETA/M and ETA/PM (Fatherland and Liberty—Military and Political-Military) and by GRAPO (the Communist First of October Antifascist Group) toward an accommodation with the new Socialist government, although never promising, have come up empty. GRAPO has dropped its unilaterally announced truce; ETA/PM has indicated that it has no intention of pursuing negotiations with Madrid; and ETA/M has continued its pattern of frequent and lethal terrorist attacks. In Portugal, the Popular Force 25 April (FP-25), after a yearlong period of inactivity, has recently conducted a series of robberies—presumably to bankroll future operations. [ ]



Elsewhere, terrorists have been inactive, either because of effective law enforcement and security or because of local accommodations between terrorist groups and the authorities. [ ]

After a surge of activity by anti-American terrorists in mid-December, West Germany has been quiet. Enhanced security measures, in our view, have increased the difficulty of attacks against US military housing areas and personnel by such local groups as the Revolutionary Cells and Red Army Faction (RAF) "legals." We believe RAF has been crippled for the time being by arrests in late 1982 of three key operatives. It may be reorganizing and absorbing new personnel, a process likely to prevent operations for months. In Italy, we believe the Red Brigades remain in disarray because of a series of significant law enforcement successes over the past several months. [ ]

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The French Government has kept the lid on in France by cracking down on indigenous terrorists, particularly Direct Action and the Corsican National Liberation Front and by arranging truces with such international groups as Black June and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. We believe Armenian terrorists may start a number of new operations against Turkish and, perhaps, American targets worldwide, including France, to avenge the disappearance of prominent Armenian Tashnak Party official Avram Ashdjian from Beirut on 29 December. Black June's truces with France, the United Kingdom, and Austria are holding. [ ]

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There have been no attacks by major Palestinian groups in Western Europe since September. Groups affiliated with the PLO remain under the PLO ban against international terrorism. [ ] moderate PLO leadership is still under radical pressure to rescind the ban and that Arafat has approved contingency measures including reestablishment of terrorist support structures in Western Europe and training of operatives. [ ]

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## Arms Seizure Leads to Arrest of Possible Accomplice in Papal Shooting [REDACTED]

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A small-time arms dealer who may be linked to the weapon used by Mehmet Ali Agca against the Pope was arrested on 11 January in Austria. [REDACTED]

According to the US Embassy in Vienna, Austrian customs authorities at a border crossing with Czechoslovakia seized a truck carrying 300 pistols and rifles hidden under a declared cargo of ammunition on 11 January. Among the weapons confiscated were Czechoslovak-made 7.65-mm CZ-70 and 9-mm CZ-75 pistols and unidentified Italian small arms. Arms described as Soviet submachineguns and Kalashnikov-type sniper rifles were also seized. These may, however, be of Czechoslovak manufacture. [REDACTED]

In a separate but probably related incident, Austrian police subsequently arrested two weapons dealers—one of whom, Horst Grillmayer—may be linked to the 9-mm Browning Hi-Power pistol used in the attempted papal assassination. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When questioned by Austrian authorities shortly after the papal shooting, Grillmayer denied any knowledge of the weapon and subsequently disappeared. [REDACTED]

Italian authorities have indicated they will charge Grillmayer with complicity in the unsuccessful assassina-

tion of the Pope. They will probably also attempt to trace the Italian arms seized in Austria to determine if any had been sold to KINTEX—the Bulgarian state-controlled foreign trade organization. Italian authorities in Milan recently claimed to have uncovered what one official described as the world's largest illegal arms smuggling organization, and the investigating magistrate has publicly alleged that Bulgaria is a key contact point for this traffic. [REDACTED]

Of equal importance, however, are the Czechoslovak weapons seized in Austria. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] French authorities also claim that Israeli Embassy Second Secretary Vacov Barsimantov was assassinated with the same 7.65-mm Czechoslovak pistol in April 1982 that was used to kill US Military Attache Col. Charles Ray in January 1982 in Paris. [REDACTED]

We suspect, however, that Ray and Barsimantov were killed with a Czechoslovak submachinegun and not a semiautomatic pistol. According to French media reports, ballistics experts who examined the spent cartridges have determined that the ammunition used in both attacks had been fired from a weapon with a vertical ejection system. The only Czechoslovak 7.65-mm weapon with this kind of ejection is the Model 61 "Skorpion" submachinegun—P-27, CZ-50, and CZ-70 7.65-mm Czechoslovak pistols all have standard Mauser-type right-hand ejection ports. Despite its relatively low-powered cartridge, the Skorpion is an ideal terrorist weapon because of its small size and high rate of fire. When fired in the semiautomatic mode, its metal stock can be folded forward giving the weapon the appearance of a large pistol such as the one described by eyewitnesses to the Barsimantov attack. [REDACTED]

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## Guatemalan Terrorists Target Presidential Families [ ]

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The kidnaping of the daughter of Honduran President Suazo in Guatemala City on 14 December and the abduction in October of Guatemalan President Rios Montt's nephew were conducted by a new terrorist coalition, the Revolutionary People's Movement (MRP). [ ]

[ ] the group was organized by dissident militants frustrated by the inability of the Guatemalan left to unify and coordinate operations. Membership is reported to be drawn from the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Our Movement (NM), and the Military Commission (COMIL). [ ]

Rios Montt's nephew, kidnaped on 13 October, was rescued by security forces 41 days later in a shootout in Guatemala City, during which two of his abductors were killed. The kidnapers had demanded the release of a young woman, an MRP activist, in exchange for his safe return. Rios Montt—maintaining the government's hardline policy—publicly vowed that he would not negotiate with the kidnapers and, fortunately, his nephew's rescue was successfully effected. [ ]

In the case of President Suazo's daughter, the MRP- [ ]

[ ] Its sole demand was that a 12-page manifesto be published in some 20 major newspapers in Central America and Mexico and broadcast over national radio and television in Guatemala. These conditions were met, despite a Guatemalan Government decree prohibiting dissemination of subversive material. On 23 December, President Suazo's daughter was released unharmed. [ ]

The aim of the operation, we believe, was to humiliate and to erode public confidence in both the Guatemalan and Honduran Governments. MRP demands, relatively inconsequential and easily met, were probably designed to place the Rios Montt government in a "no-win" situation. Compliance would demonstrate 25X1 that the government lacked resolve to carry out its policies. On the other hand, if the government prohibited publication, it would appear inflexible and inhumane, and its relations with Honduras would have been strained. [ ] 25X1 25X1

The Guatemalan Government was particularly adept in its handling of the incident [ ] 25X1

Using [ ] the same formula employed when the son of Minister of the Interior Mendez Ruiz was kidnaped in the spring of 1982, the government permitted the family to arrange for publication of the manifesto without public retreat from its hardline policy of nonnegotiation with terrorists. The night of the Suazo abduction, Mendez Ruiz, a sympathetic and persuasive speaker, appeared on nationwide radio and TV and placed the onus squarely on the kidnapers. Appearing concerned and compassionate, he expressed themes and arguments that were replayed by the media throughout Latin America. [ ] 25X1 25X1

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**Yasir Arafat:  
The PLO's Consensus Leader**

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We believe Yasir Arafat's number-one priority is to maintain his leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and his position as spokesman for the broad-based Palestinian movement. Sensitive to the complex political differences among Palestinians and the broader Arab community, Arafat has finely honed a consensual decisionmaking style, which has helped him to retain the leadership of the PLO for 13 turbulent years. Throughout his career, he has acquired and exploited power by shrewdly playing off factions, alternately propitiating both his moderate and more radical factions to avoid splitting the movement. At the same time, his unwillingness to risk losing his across-the-board support has inhibited Arafat from taking more decisive actions. In our judgment, this pattern of gradual and incremental change in PLO policies is likely to persist.

On the international scene, as within the PLO, Arafat is nonconfrontational, never allowing himself the luxury of vendettas. Arafat goes to great lengths to avoid polarizing the major powers into friend/enemy camps. Rather, he treats them all as actual or potential allies, always stressing the commonality of interests rather than dwelling on points of difference. Arafat would undoubtedly welcome a dialogue with the United States, but not at the price of unconditional recognition of Israel, since in all likelihood this would destroy his consensus leadership of the PLO. Yasir Arafat will not, in our opinion, support any issue or agreement that seriously threatens his leadership.

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Arafat has an impressive ability to be all things to all people. A master of ambiguity, he skillfully blurs conflicting images:

- He is able to project a moderate image to the Palestinian intelligentsia, the moderate Arab world, Western leaders, and the mass media, implying he is on the verge of recognizing Israel's right to exist.
- Concomitantly, he is able to convey to the more radical Palestinian guerrillas a sense of militant determination and an image of steadfast commitment to Israel's elimination.

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Arafat has a number of other qualities that have contributed to his long tenure in office. These include a proven capacity to withstand stress, a demonstrated perseverance in pursuit of his personal and political goals, a belief that he is uniquely qualified to lead the Palestinian resistance, a strong sense of self-esteem, and freedom from the constraints of ideological disputes.

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## Special Analysis

### French Counterterrorist Attitudes—How Equal? How Fraternal? [ ]

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Since last summer the French Government has reacted with varying degrees of firmness to the terrorist threat, apparently willing to be forceful with indigenous French groups but softer with international terrorist groups [ ]

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The present situation reflects tensions, which persist despite President Mitterrand's nationally televised announcement on 17 August that the government would intensify its antiterrorism effort in part by restructuring and strengthening the security forces. The day after Mitterrand's announcement, the Cabinet, invoking a 1936 law that bans private militias, outlawed the French terrorist group, Direct Action. The Cabinet termed it a "movement composed of people favoring violent actions, in contact with foreign extremist movements and organized for commando actions, calling for armed struggle and the use of terrorist methods." [ ]

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At approximately the same time that Direct Action, by its own admission, was busy in Paris last summer with a series of anti-Semitic attacks, the Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC) ended a 15-month bombing moratorium, in effect under the Mitterrand government, with some 60 simultaneous bombings on the island. The government had been attempting to defuse Corsican dissidence by offering amnesty to separatists and holding elections for the island's first regional assembly in the fall of 1982. Separatists boycotted the elections and the new year has brought a surge of violence, with eight bombing and shooting attacks against nonnative residents who refused to go along with a new FNLC tactic—the imposition of a "revolutionary tax." The FNLC also changed its modus operandi with at least one assassination attempt. [ ]

The French Government reacted by outlawing the FNLC—the leading separatist organization—again invoking the 1936 law. To further emphasize the harder line, the government named as coordinator of security forces on Corsica Robert Broussard, widely celebrated in France for his success as head of France's antigangster squad. The appointment of Broussard, who has a reputation for ruthlessness, suggests that Mitterrand is ready to modify, and perhaps abandon, his earlier policy of fighting nationalist-inspired violence with political reform. Mitterrand emphasized in his annual New Year's address that Corsica would remain French and that terrorists would feel the full force of French law. Presumably the Breton separatists, who have been waging an intermittent and less violent terrorism campaign, will also take heed [ ]

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In contrast, the government seems unprepared to pursue a consistent policy regarding terrorism perpetrated by the Armenians in France. Armenian terrorists have, in the last seven years, gradually spread their assassinations across Western Europe and finally reached out to Canada, the United States, Australia, and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria). More Turkish officials have been assassinated and Turkish installations bombed in France than in any other country. France also has the second-largest concentration of ethnic Armenians in the world, and the French Government is wary of the political clout of large Armenian communities in Paris, Marseilles, Nice, and Lyons. [ ]

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In August the French leftist newspaper *Liberation* referred to a charge that Louis Joinet, a member of the Prime Minister's staff, had negotiated a truce in

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January with the subgroup of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) known as "Orly." The truce, which committed the French not to arrest non-French Armenians, was broken by the arrest in June of an Armenian terrorist wanted in the United States. A French court ruled against extradition, and the terrorist was released to another country.

[redacted] the French Government last year quietly arranged an accommodation with the radical Palestinian Black June Organization (BJO) under which BJO would cease terrorist activities in France in return for an unspecified French gesture.

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[redacted] ASALA leaders have blackmailed or tried to blackmail officials of Italy and Switzerland into leniency toward ASALA operatives or, in the case of Italy, discontinuation of the processing in Rome of refugees from Soviet Armenia. In the event of noncompliance, ASALA has threatened to resume terrorist operations in the country in question or against its installations or personnel in other countries.

In spite of this uneven French Government counter-terrorism record, we believe that the government is attempting to control terrorist groups, domestic or international, on French soil. The US Embassy in Paris notes that the upcoming visit of Justice Minister Badinter, who is a specialist on extradition, may lead to modification and updating of France's extradition treaty with the United States. This would represent forward movement in the French Government's "war" on terrorism. The security problem in France, which created a public uproar last summer and led to Mitterrand's TV address, remains an issue, and municipal elections, scheduled for March, could be exploited by the opposition and pressure the French Government for concrete progress in the terrorism arena.

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## Statistical Overview

Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982 <sup>a</sup>


	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>746</b>
Government officials	7	1	3	1	4	0	4	5	1	0	2	2	30
Diplomats	40	13	47	40	34	40	36	47	30	34	19	11	391
Military	6	1	6	6	6	8	8	10	9	13	5	7	85
Business	11	12	11	13	9	35	13	13	4	2	8	6	137
Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students	8	5	3	9	2	5	7	2	5	3	2	3	54
Other	5	2	6	3	0	7	5	13	1	4	2	1	49

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982 <sup>a</sup>

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>746</b>
North America	3	7	8	8	6	1	6	8	2	6	1	2	58
Latin America	10	6	22	20	21	11	17	11	11	18	12	4	163
Western Europe	42	9	25	25	17	65	25	37	24	22	15	15	321
USSR/Eastern Europe	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	2	3	3	3	0	16
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	3	1	2	0	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	13
Middle East and North Africa	16	4	12	15	9	11	13	24	5	3	3	1	116
Asia/other	5	3	8	1	2	5	10	6	4	3	4	8	59

<sup>a</sup> Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

## Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks, 1981 and 1982



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**Chronology**

*This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications.* [redacted]

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**13 December 1982****Mexico**

Some 500 members of the Committee for Popular Defense (CDP), a leftist Mexican organization, vandalized the exterior of the US Consulate in Juarez during a demonstration, causing extensive damage. Despite the fact that the Consulate had requested additional security, police protection was inadequate. The demonstrators said they would return in 20 days. An official protest has been lodged with the Mexican Government. [redacted]

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**23 December 1982****Israel**

A bomb threat was received by the US Embassy in Tel Aviv from a caller who claimed credit in the name of a previously unknown group, "The Organization Against Foreign Military in Lebanon." The caller gave no further details, and a thorough search by Embassy security failed to locate an explosive device. Although this particular "group" is not known to have claimed any previous terrorist acts, two little-known groups with similar names have taken credit for past attacks against Israeli, Fatah, and US interests (including the attack against US Ambassador to Lebanon Dean in August 1980). Despite the implication of one or possibly several separate nationalistic Lebanese groups or individuals, the apparent lack of anti-Syrian activities suggests that radical, pro-Syrian factions—using a nationalist facade—are more likely responsible. [redacted]

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**29 December 1982****Lebanon**

In Beirut a Central Committee member and chief of intelligence for the Armenian Tashnak Party Avram Ashdjan was kidnaped en route to his office. Armenian spokesmen have blamed the Turks. [redacted]

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**1 January 1983****Haiti**

Three persons were killed and 10 injured by a car bomb that exploded near the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince. Credit for the attack was claimed by the Hector Riobe Brigade, which first surfaced in July 1982, when it unsuccessfully attempted to blow up a bridge in an isolated Port-au-Prince suburb and accidentally wounded an American tourist. [redacted]

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**Turkey**

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) has sent threatening letters to Turkish diplomatic installations. According to the Turkish

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press, numerous "visiting cards of death" have been received by Turkish diplomats throughout Western Europe. [REDACTED]

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4 January 1983

**Spain**

In San Sebastian suspected Basque terrorists planted a bomb at the state-controlled news agency EFE. The explosion damaged equipment, but no injuries were sustained because the terrorists forewarned EFE, and the building was evacuated beforehand. ETA/Military is suspected of the attack, which was claimed as a response to EFE coverage of Basque news. [REDACTED]

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6 January 1983

**Portugal**

An armed gang derailed a train on the outskirts of Lisbon and stole \$167,000. One policeman was wounded. The raid may have been conducted by the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) which has perpetrated robberies to bankroll their terrorist operations and which has recently become active after a yearlong hiatus. [REDACTED]

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**Turkey**

In Istanbul the recapture of notorious Revolutionary Way (Dev Sol) terrorist Celaledin Can at a safehouse in a suburb of Istanbul also netted security officials large quantities of explosives and detailed surveillance notes of prominent Turkish and foreign officials, including US Consulate officials. [REDACTED]

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7 January 1983

**Spain**

In Bermeo two Spanish naval officers were injured in a machinegun attack by suspected Basque terrorists. Both officers were in civilian clothes and were attacked as they left their residences. Details of the attack indicate careful surveillance of the targets, which has been the modus operandi of ETA/M in its campaign against the Spanish military. [REDACTED]

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8 January 1983

**Spain**

In Hendaye, France, a spokesman for the VIII Assembly of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty/Political-Military Wing (ETA/PM) announced the group will not negotiate with the Spanish Government for a cease-fire or truce and will begin a new campaign to obtain "revolutionary taxes." The spokesman reiterated ETA/PM's assurances that it will commit no armed actions in French territory, which appears to be an attempt to mollify French security concerns regarding Basque terrorist activities in France. [REDACTED]

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**Israel**

Three Palestinian groups have claimed credit for the grenade attack on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv that resulted in at least 12 injuries. On 10 January the PLO's Nicosia press office said an unidentified PLO unit had carried out the operation. The

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attack was the first in some time not involving preset explosives and the first major incident of this type in that city in several years. The PLO's Saiqa and the non-PLO Black June Organization also took credit, but we cannot confirm either of the claims, which have been made to generate publicity. [ ] 25X1

**Lebanon**

In Beirut the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) mailed a three-page printed brochure to foreign embassies accusing the "American and Western mass media and political circles" of a concerted strategy against the Armenian national liberation movement. No direct threat was made against any country except Turkey; however, it appears several countries in which Armenian terrorists are imprisoned received the brochure. [ ] 25X1

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10 January 1983

**Spain**

In San Sebastian the ETA Political/Military Wing VIII Assembly (ETA/PM) kidnaped the son of a local industrialist and gave the shortest deadline ever, seven days, for ransom payment. ETA/PM lacks funds and needs to demonstrate its credibility after the 30 December police rescue of a previous kidnap victim. The extremely short ransom deadline directly challenges the Spanish Government's promise to strangle ETA financially by preventing payments of ransom and revolutionary taxes. [ ] 25X1

11 January 1983

**Spain**

In Madrid the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) announced that it had ended its two-month truce with the Spanish Government. The communique accused the Spanish Government of breaking the truce and announced that GRAPO was ready to conduct operations against the regime. Despite the death in a police shootout of GRAPO leader Juan Martin Luna in December and Spanish estimates that the group now contains only 12 active members, GRAPO has shown considerable ability to overcome severe setbacks in the past and may do so again. [ ] 25X1

12 January 1983


**Turkey**

In Ankara 740 suspected members of the Marxist organization Dev Sol went on trial for murder, kidnaping, and robbery stemming from an aborted takeover of the Black Sea town of Fatsa. This trial may spark some terrorist reprisals,

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especially around 28 January, which is the anniversary of the death of the founder of the Turkish Communist Party.  25X1



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